THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION EXEMPTION
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT AND THE BOARD'S
DISCRETIONARY
AUTHORITY
The collective bargaining rights set forth in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)l extend only to workers qualifying as
"employees" within the meaning of the Act.2 The definition of

employee is limited to those individuals employed by an entity that
meets the Act's definition of "employer. ' 3 Because section 2(2) of the
Act specifies that states and political subdivisions are not "employers, ' 4
employees of these entities receive none of the Act's protections. Thus,
the threshold determination whether an entity is a political subdivision

is of utmost importance to workers seeking the protection of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency charged with the

5
enforcement of the NLRA.
Despite the far-reaching ramifications of the determination
whether an entity is a political subdivision, Congress failed to define

the term "political subdivision" in the NLRA. As a result, the task of
defining the scope of the exemption has been left to the Board and the

courts. Although it has not been difficult to make this determination in
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
2. The rights protected by the Act are set forth in section 7, which provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The means by which these rights may be violated by employers and labor
organizations are set forth respectively in sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b)
(1976).
3. "Employee" is defined in section 2(3) of the Act as follows: "The term 'employee'.
shall not include any individual employed. . . by any other person who is not an employer as
herein provided." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
4. NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), states that "[t]he term
'employer'... shall not include. . . any state or political subdivision thereof."
5. The Board's primary responsibilities include conducting representation elections and
certifying exclusive bargaining agents. See NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
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many cases, 6 the distinction between political subdivisions and private
7
employers is frequently unclear.
The Board's exercise of its discretion to decline jurisdiction8
complicates further an analysis of the scope of the political subdivision
exemption. The Board relies frequently on its discretionary authority
to exempt from its jurisdiction employers that provide services to or on
behalf of political subdivisions. 9 Thus, the political subdivision
exemption of section 2(2) operates at two levels: first, it exempts
entities that do not meet the statutory definition of employer because
they are political subdivisions and second, it exempts entities that fall
within the definition of employer, but are nonetheless granted a
discretionary exemption by the Board.
This note addresses the problems that exist in the application of
the political subdivision exemption. Part I discusses the evolution of
the statutory exemption and the Board's development of the
discretionary exemption. Part II analyzes several recent decisions
issued by the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits t0
and discusses those courts' misapplication of the exemption and their
incursions upon the Board's discretionary authority. Part III of the note
concludes that the Board's use of the discretionary exemption is
unnecessary, and suggests that the Board might alleviate some of the
difficulties created by the courts' misconstruction of the exemption by
relying solely on the statutory criteria set forth by the Supreme Court." t
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION EXEMPTION

A. The Statutory Exemption
During the early years of the NLRA, the Board had few occasions
to apply the political subdivision exemption. Entities claiming the exemption clearly fell within the intended scope of the clause.' 2 Conse6. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
7. See, eg., Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole (Chicago Youth Centers), 235

N.L.R.B. 776 (1978), rev'd, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980). See generally infra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text.

8. NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)(1976). See infra text accompanying note 51 for
the text of section 14(c)(1).
9. See infra notes 49-95 and accompanying text.
10. Board of Trustees v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Chicago Youth
Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.

1979). See infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text.
11. See NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971). See infra notes 27-48 and

accompanying text.
12. See New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 33 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954) (exempting turnpike authority
created by state legislature); City of Anchorage, 32 L.ILR.M. 1549 (1953) (exempting incorporated
municipality); Oxnard Harbor Dist., 34 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1941) (exempting harbor district administered by elected officials); Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 8 N.L.R.B. 1297, 1318 (1938) (exempting Alabama
State Docks Commission).
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quently, the Board's perfunctory opinions included no meaningful

analysis of the clause and failed to consider whether "political subdivi13
sion" should be defined in the context of state or federal law.

The Board first considered whether state law should control the
political subdivision determination in New Bedford, Woods Hole,
Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket Steamship Authority. 14 The Board disregarded the need for uniform application of the clause and declared
that state law would control its decision.' 5 The Board then held that

the Steamship Authority was a political subdivision, citing three factors: the Authority was created pursuant to a general enabling act of
the state; its bonds were classified as those of the state; and it was performing "essential state functions."' 6
The Board's reliance on state law to make the political subdivision
determination was short-lived. The Board overruled the New Bedford
decision in Randolph Electric Membership Corp. 17 when it asserted ju-

risdiction over an electric cooperative despite a North Carolina statute
declaring such corporations to be political subdivisions of the state. In
Randolph Electric, the Board rejected the corporation's argument that
state law was conclusive, and held that although the state's designation
8
was a factor to be considered, it was not controlling.'

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced

the Board's decision, rejecting the employer's contention that Congress
intended state law declarations to control the political subdivision determination.' 9 The court reasoned that such an interpretation would
13. Due to the ease with which the early cases were decided, the intended scope of the political subdivision exemption was not addressed by Congress in the debates over proposed changes
in the Act that eventually resulted in the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L.
Sess., 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, Pub. L.
No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 80th Cong., Ist
No. 257, 73 Stat. 519, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959.
14. 127 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1960).
15. Id at 1324. Without uniform application of the political subdivision exemption,. the coverage of the Act would vary greatly between states, in clear contravention of Congressional intent
to provide for a national labor policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
16. 127 N.L.R.B. at 1324-26.
17. 145 N.L.R.B. 158 (1963).
18. 1d at 161. The Board stated:
This statutory designation as a public agency is, of course, a factor to be weighed carefully by the Board. We do not think, however, that this declaration should be controlling
when, as here, the corporation sought to be exempt as a political subdivision of the
States, is not created directly by the State, or administered by State-appointed or publicly
elected individuals.
Id
The Supreme Court later addressed the Board's implication that political subdivisions must
be created by the state or administered by public officials in NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402
U.S. 600 (1971). See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
19. NLRB v. Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1965). The court
concluded that the Board erred in New Bedford when it held that state law determined the defini-
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frustrate congressional efforts to achieve a uniform national labor policy. The court stated that Congress does not, absent clear language to
the contrary, intend to0 make the application of a federal statute depen2
dent upon state law.
Two years later, the Board relied on Randolph Electric when it
held in NaturalGas Utili&y District of Hawkins Coun y, Tenn. 21 that a
utility district was not a political subdivision, despite a contrary deterniinationby the Tennessee Supreme Court in an earlier case.22 The
Board held that several factors outweighed the Tennessee court's determination: the district was neither created by the state nor administered
by state-appointed officials; its operations were not substantially different from those of a private utility; and it was free from state control in
conducting its daily affairs. 23
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held in NLRB v. NaturalGas Utili y District that the Supreme Court of
Tennessee's decision was conclusive and reversed the Board's holdtion of "political subdivision." 343 F.2d at 63 n.6. In New Bedford, the Board relied on Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946), in which the Supreme Court held that
courts should rely on state law to define ambiguous terms appearing in federal statutes. d at 210.
The court of appeals distinguished Beaver County on the ground that the statute in question, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, was not intended to receive uniform application,
whereas Congress intended that the NLRA be applied uniformly. 343 F.2d at 63 n.6.
20. 343 F.2d at 62. The court of appeals recognized the potential for abuse if states were free
to unilaterally exempt chosen entities from the jurisdiction of the Board:
The fact that North Carolina sees fit to characterize such corporations as "political subdivisions" and to accord them certain benefits in respect to state taxation and otherwise
... is not decisive of the question before us, since their relation to the state and their
actual methods of operation do not fit the label given them.
343 F.2d at 64.
In deciding that the Board properly disregarded state law definitions of "political subdivision," the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U.S. 111 (1944). In Hearst, the Supreme Court held that the Board had the authority to disregard
state law definitions of "employer" and "employee." The Court in Hearst affirmed the Board's
decision that independent contractors (newsboys) fell within the statutory definition of "employee.' Id at 132. Congress reacted to the Court's result by excluding independent contractors
from the definition of "employee" when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat.
136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)). Although Congress stated that the words of the Act
were to be given their ordinary meaning, Congress did not conclude that state law provided these
ordinary meanings. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). Although the Hearst
definition of "employee" was rejected by Congress, the court of appeals.relied on the Supreme
Court's dicta in Hearst, which gave the Board considerable latitude to define the terms used in the
Act in accordance with the purposes of the Act; see also NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S.
398, 414 (1947).
21. 167 N.L.R.B. 691 (1967).
22. In First Suburban Water Util. Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 146 S.W.2d 948 (1941),
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that all such utility districts were state instrumentalities. Id
at 133, 146 S.W.2d at 950.
23. 167 N.L.R.B. at 692.
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ing. 24 The court distinguished the Fourth Circuit's decision in Randoiph Electric on the ground that there was no determination by the
state supreme court in that case;2 however, the court failed to address
the Fourth Circuit's contention that the need for national uniformity
requires a federal law definition of the political subdivision
26
exemption.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision,27 but rejected the lower court's conclusion that state law controls the political
subdivision determination.2 8 Instead, the Court agreed with the
Board's conclusion that state law declarations and interpretations are
relevant, but not controlling.2 9 The Court examined the Board's construction of the exemption 3o and adopted what it found to be the
Board's test: it limited the exemption to entities that were "(1) created
directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative
arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are
responsible to public officials or the general electorate. ' 31 This statement of the test differed from the version set forth by the Board 32 in
that the second part of the Court's test expanded the definition of a
political subdivision to include entities administered by individuals responsible to public officials, and not merely entities administered by
public officials themselves. This new formulation of the test encompassed the utility district in NaturalGas because the district was admin33
istered by commissioners appointed by an elected county official.
Because the Court did not recognize that it had applied a different
34
test, it concluded that the Board had simply misapplied its own test.
24. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 427 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1970). After asserting juris-

diction, the Board ordered a representation election, and the union won. The political subdivision
question arose on appeal when the employer refused to bargain. Id at 313.
25. Id
26. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
27. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 609 (1971).

28. Id at 602.
29. Id The court stated that "[flederal, rather than state, law governs the determination,
under § 2(2), whether an entity created under state law is a 'political subdivision' of the state and
therefore not an 'employer' subject to the Act." Id at 603.
30. Courts accord great weight to the Board's determination of its statutory authority. See
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 (1947).
31. 402 U.S. at 604-05.
32. See Hawkins County, 167 N.L.R.B. at 692. See supra text accompanying note 23. The
change in the language apparently resulted from the Court's adoption of the language used in the
Board's brief, but that language failed to explain the discrepancy. Brief for the National Labor
Relations Board at 11, NLRB v. National Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971). See Labor LawFederal Law Controls Construction of Term "PoliticalSubdivision" In NationalLabor Relations
4ct, 37 Mo. L. REV. 134, 142 (1972).

33. 402 U.S. at 605.
34. Id
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This conclusion obviated the need for the Court to decide whether an

entity must satisfy one of the two parts of the NaturalGas test to qual35
ify as a political subdivision.
The Natural Gas decision failed to resolve two major problems,

both of which have since been settled by the Board and the lower
courts. First, the Supreme Court in Natural Gas did not indicate

whether the political subdivision determination should be made exclusively under the Board's test as expressed in Natural Gas or by analysis
of the "actual operations and characteristics" of the entity in question.36 This ambiguity has been resolved by Board and lower court
35. The Court expressly rejected the opportunity to decide the scope of the Board's test:
"This case does not however require that we decide whether the 'actual operations and characteristics' of an entity must necessarily feature one or the other of the Board's limitations to qualify an
entity for the exemption." Id
The Court implied, however, that satisfaction of the test might not conclusively establish
political subdivision status. This implication may be drawn from the analysis undertaken by the
Court after it concluded that the entity met the "administered" requirement of the test. See supra
text accompanying note 31. The Court nonetheless went on to consider the "'actual operations
and characteristics' [of the utility district] under that administration." 402 U.S. at 605. After examining a number of the utility district's characteristics, 402 U.S. at 605-09, the Court was satisfied
that political subdivision status existed: "[r]espondent [utility district] is therefore an entity 'administered' by individuals... who are responsible to public officials. . . and this together with
the otherfactorsmentioned satisfies us that its relationship to the State is such that respondent is a
'political subdivision' ... ." 402 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added). Characteristics of the utility district that the Court examined included the following: the appointment and removal procedures
for commissioners; a Tennessee statute granting utility districts all powers necessary to accomplish
their purposes, including the power of eminent domain; a public records requirement imposed
upon the district; a public hearing requirement when rate protests are filed; and the district's status
as a political subdivision under federal income tax statutes and the Social Security Act. 402 U.S.
at 606-09. The Court clearly did not intend that these characteristics be used to define further the
"administered" requirement of the NaturalGas test because the only cited characteristics indicative of accountability to the public are the procedures for appointing and removing the district's
commissioners.
The Court's reference to the "characteristics" of an entity obscures analysis under the twopart test without adding to the definition of "political subdivision." Although governmental entities frequently possess the characteristics mentioned by the Court, private sector entities are often
subject to public disclosure and public hearing requirements as well and often possess many of the
powers that the utility district possessed in NaturalGas. For example, private utilities sometimes
possess the power of eminent domain, see Cline v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 260 F.2d 271, 273-74
(10th Cir. 1958), and states have granted tax exempt status to private utilities. See Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 215 F.2d 542, 543 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955). In
addition, because dissimilar purposes are served by the various statutes, the district's status under
federal tax laws or the Social Security Act should not be determinative of the application of federal labor laws. See also PoliticalSubdivision-Qual#Fca/ionsforExclusionfrom the Labor-Management Relations.4c, 28 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 268, 284 n.101 (1971).
36. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 605 (1971). The ambiguity resulted from
the Court's extensive analysis of "other factors" after it declined to hold that the Board's test was
determinative of political subdivision status.
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decisions consistently holding that the two-part Natural Gas test is the
primary determinant of political subdivision status. 37

The second principal shortcoming of the NaturalGas decision was
the Court's failure to define adequately the alternative components of
the test: the requirement that, to be exempted, an entity must be either
created by the state or administered by individuals responsible to public officials or the general electorate.38 The first component of the test

has not been overly troublesome because the Board and the lower
courts have defined narrowly the requirement that the entities be created by the state to include only those entities that constitute depart39
ments or administrative arms of the political subdivision.
The second component of the test presents the more difficult prob-

lem of determining when the individuals administering the entity in
37. The Board frequently terminates the political subdivision inquiry after applying the NaturalGas test, without considering any extraneous factors. See Northhampton Center for Children
& Families, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1981); Community Health & Home Care, Inc., 251
N.L.R.B. 509 (1980); Museum of Fine Arts, 218 N.L.R.B. 715, 716 (1975); Minneapolis Soc'y of
Fine Arts, 194 N.L.R.B. 371, 372 (1971). The "actual operations" that have been considered by
the Board and the lower courts have generally been limited to those factors mentioned by the
Supreme Court in NaturalGas. See, ag., Crilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 529 F.2d 1355,
1358 (3d Cir. 1976); Commissioners of the Rouse Estate, 225 N.L.R.B. 920 (1976); Electrical Dist.
No. Two, 224 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1976). When the Board considers the "actual operations" of an
entity it does so not as an alternative to the NaturalGas test, but to assist in the application of the
test, see NLRB v. Highview, Inc., 590 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.), modoed, 595 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1979);
Camden-Clark Memorial Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 945, 945 (1975), and to lend additional support to
the result yielded by application of the test. See Truman Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d
570, 572 (8th Cir. 1981); City Pub. Serv. Bd., 197 N.L.RB. 312, 314 (1972); Natchez Trace Elec.
Power Ass'n, 193 N.L.R.B. 1098 (1971), aft'd, 476 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1973). Finally, in no case
was the result yielded by application of the NaturalGas test rejected in favor of a contrary result
based upon an analysis of the "actual operations."
38. See supra text accompanying note 31.
39. For cases holding that the "created directly by the state" requirement was met, see Crilly
v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1358 (3d Cir. 1976); Northhampton Center for
Children & Families, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1981); New York Inst. for the Educ. of the
Blind, 254 N.L.R.B. 664 (1981); Association for the Developmentally Disabled, 231 N.L.R.B. 784
(1977); City Pub. Serv. Bd., 197 N.L.R.B. 312 (1972).
In some cases, the courts found that the state created the entity, but denied the exemption
because the state did not intend the entity to be a department or administrative arm of the state.
See Truman Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981) (jurisdiction asserted
over a hospital established by the Kansas City Department of Health); NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, 606 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction asserted over a counseling service
founded and administered initially by the Illinois Department of Mental Health); Commissioners
of the Rouse Estate, 225 N.L.R.B. 920 (1976) (jurisdiction asserted over nursing home established
by bequest, though the state legislature passed an act providing that county commissioners would
serve as commissioners of the nursing home).
For cases in which the Board rejected the employer's argument that it was created by the
state, see Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Serv. Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1977); MorristownHamblen Hosp. Ass'n, 226 N.L.R.B. 76 (1976); Museum of Fine Arts, 218 N.L.R.B. 715 (1975);
Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass'n, 193 N.L.R.B. 1098 (1971), enforced, 476 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1973).
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question are responsible to public officials or the general electorate.
When a statute establishes that the entity is to be directed by public
officials or their appointees, as did the statute in Natural Gas,40 the
Board has acknowledged that the entity is a political subdivision over
which it has no jurisdiction.4 ' If no statute establishes conclusively that
control of the entity rests with public officials, the Board must use an
alternative approach. The Board analyzes the composition of an entity's directorate and determines whether a majority of the individuals
comprising the directing body are acting as representatives of the government. 42 If a majority of the directors are responsible to elected public officials, 43 and are acting in their official capacity,4 the Board has
generally found that the entity satisfies the "administered" requirement
and is a political subdivision in its own right.4 5 When the individuals
administering the entity are responsible to public officials only by vir40. 402 U.S. at 605.
41. See, e.g., Northern Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 323 (1979);
Temple Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1972); City of Austell Natural Gas Sys., 186 N.L.R.B. 280
(1970).
42. For cases in which the Board analyzed the composition of an entity's board of directors,
see Saratoga County Economic Opportunity Council Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 453 (1980); Community
Serv. Planning Council, 243 N.L.R.B. 798 (1979); Loma Prieta Regional Center, Inc., 241
N.L.R.B. 1071 (1979); Northern Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 323 (1979);
Truman Medical Center, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1978), enforced, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981);
Museum of Fine Arts, 218 N.L.R.B. 715 (1975); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, 194 N.L.R.B. 371
(1971).
43. An entity's administrators may themselves be elected public officials, rather than individuals responsible to such officials. See Electrical Dist. No. Two, 224 N.L.R.B. 904 (1976). In several cases decided prior to NaturalGas, the Board considered whether the elected officials must be
elected by the general electorate in order for the entity to qualify as a political subdivision. See
Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 186 N.L.R.B. 827 (1970), enforcement deniedpercurtam, 469
F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1972) (denying political subdivision status when only landowners, and not the
general electorate, voted for elected officials); Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 164 N.L.R.B. 1176
(1967). It appears, however, that the Board no longer requires the officials to be elected by the
gezieral electorate, as opposed to property owners, at least when the officials are subject to recall
by the general electorate. See Electrical Dist. No. Two, 224 N.L.R.B. 904 (1976).
44. The Board has recognized that directors may be appointed by a public body and yet be
independent of the public body. See Saratoga County Economic Opportunity Council, Inc., 249
N.L.R.B. 453 (1980).
45. See, eg., Northern Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 323 (1979). But
see Community Action Program, 251 N.L.R.B. 86, 86 n.4 (1980). In Community Action Program
the Board asserted jurisdiction over an employer providing a variety of social services, even
though one third of the employer's board of directors were appointed by the mayor of Oklahoma
City and another third were elected by the voters in the target area of the employer's operations.
The Board noted that the composition of the board of directors was mandated by the employer's
bylaws and not by federal statute as the employer claimed, but did not address the significance of
this finding. 1d
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tue of a contractual arrangement, however, the Board has found the
"administered" requirement is not satisfied.4 6
Both parts of the Natural Gas test focus on where ultimate control
of the entity lies; when the state controls the entity, the entity is exempt
from the Board's jurisdiction. For an entity to qualify as a political
subdivision under the first part of the test, it must be a "department or
administrative arm of the state," 47 which implies state control. The second part of the test exempts entities that are administered by individuals responsible to public officials. 4 8 If the administrators of an entity
are "responsible" to public officials, then the entity as a whole is controlled by the state. Thus, the determination whether an entity qualifies
as a political subdivision and is exempt from the Board's jurisdiction
depends upon whether the entity is controlled by the state.
B.

The "Discretionary"Exemption

If an employing entity does not qualify as an "employer" under
the definition set forth in section 2(2), the Board lacks statutory jurisdiction. 49 In discretionary exemption cases, however, the Board possesses statutory jurisdiction, but declines to exercise its authority over a
particular class of employers.50 Section 14(c)(1) of the Act, which confers upon the Board discretionary authority to disclaim its jurisdiction,
provides that the Board may "decline to assert jurisdiction over any
51
labor dispute."
46. See, ag., Ankh Servs., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 478 (1979); Grey Nuns of the Sacred Heart, 221
N.L.R.B. 1215 (1975).
47. See supra text accompanying note 31.
48. Id
49. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975). The Board has exercised its
discretionary authority and exempted employers from its jurisdiction for many reasons unrelated
to the political subdivision exemption. For example, the Board previously exempted charitable
organizations from its jurisdiction-see Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. 899 (1974)
(overruled in Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976)), and will not
assert its jurisdiction over employers whose revenues are less than the minimum amount established by the Board for that particular class of employers. N.L.R.B. JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE 4-7
(1973).
51. NLRA, § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976). Section 14(c)(1) provides that
the Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board,
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Id
The Board has wide latitude in exercising its discretionary power. See NLRB v. WGOK, Inc.,
384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1967). Board decisions will withstand judicial scrutiny so long as
similar situations are treated in similar ways. See Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 684,
686 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Board may even treat similar cases differently so long as it remains
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The Board grants discretionary exemptions in the political subdivision context when a private employer is closely associated with an
exempt political subdivision. 52 The Board has developed two tests to
determine whether the private employer's relationship with the exempt
entity is sufficiently close to justify an exemption from the Board's jurisdiction: the "intimate connection" test,53 and its successor, the "right
of control" test.54 The granting of exemptions on the basis of tests that
purport to measure the closeness of a business relationship, however,
has resulted in numerous challenges to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction by employers claiming the exemption.5 5 Such challenges increase
the Board's case load, allow employers to delay representation elections, and increase the chances of frustrating union organization
56
drives.
1. The Intimate Connection Test. The Board in 1968 first proposed a test to determine whether an employer possessed a sufficiently
close association with an exempt entity to justify a discretionary exemption for the employer when it set forth the "intimate connection"
test in Herbert Harvey, Inc.57 The employer in Herbert Harvey provided,janitorial services for the building occupied by the World Bank
and claimed that the Bank's exemption as a political subdivision extended to it.58 Despite an earlier holding by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit that the employer and the World Bank
were joint employers,5 9 the Board decided that the employer exercised
within a "zone of reasonableness." Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (appeal after remand).
52. See, eg., Teledyne Economic Dev. Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1976); ARA Serv., 221
N.L.R.B. 64 (1975); Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975); Current Constr. Corp.,
209 N.L.R.B. 718 (1974).
53. See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
55. See, eg., Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981); Truman
Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. St. Louis Comprehensive
Neighborhood Health Center, Inc., 633 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 99 (1981);
Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Chicago
Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, Inc., 606
F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1979).
56. For cases discussing these problems, see supra note 55.
57. 171 N.L.R.B. 238 (1968), enforced, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In several cases decided prior to Herbert Harvey, the Board applied the same analysis that was eventually incorporated into the intimate connection test, but the earlier cases do not appear to have been decided
with the intention of establishing a definitive standard. See Horn & Hardart Co., 154 N.L.R.B.
1368 (1965); Prophet Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1965); Crotty Bros., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964).
58. Herbert Harvey, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 254 (1966).
59. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 684, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Joint employers
are two or more employers who exert significant control over the same employees. Lutheran
Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 100-21 and accompanying
text.
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sufficient control over the employment relationship to enable it to bargain with a union.6 0 The Board rejected the employer's claim to exemption, stating:
Where the services [provided by the contractor] are intimately connected with the exempted operations of the institution, the Board has
found that the contractor shares the exemption; on the other hand,
where the services are not essential to such operations the Board has
found that the contractor 6is not exempt and asserts jurisdiction over
the contractor's activities. '

The Board then asserted jurisdiction because the janitorial services
were unrelated to the function of the World Bank as an "investment

institution." 62
Thus, when using the intimate connection test, the Board first

asked whether an employer possessed sufficient control over the employment relationship to allow effective bargaining. When there was
not sufficient control, the Board declined jurisdiction. 63 When the em-

ployer possessed sufficient control to enable it to bargain, however, the
Board then considered whether the services provided by the employer

were essential to the purpose for which the political subdivision was
created.

4

If the Board deemed the services "essential," it granted the

employer the exemption.
The intimate connection test was not a viable method for determining whether to grant a discretionary exemption, as demonstrated by
the Board's inability to make consistent determinations regarding
whether particular services are "essential" to the purpose of a political
60. 171 N.L.R.B. at 239-41.
61. Id at 240.
62. Id at 240-41.
63. Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975). The Board reached this result by reasoning that when an
employer lacks sufficient control over the employment relationship, the political subdivision involved could frustrate bargaining efforts by refusing to approve an agreement negotiated by the
employer and the bargaining representative. See Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973). The
Board concluded that this potential problem should be avoided by declining jurisdiction because
the Act does not require the employer to engage in an "exercise in futility." 385 F.2d at 686. The
Board has noted that its exercise of jurisdiction in such situations could create an irresolvable
conflict between state and federal authority. 205 N.L.R.B. at 529 n.3. The Board's concerns appear to ignore the effect of the supremacy clause, which may require political subdivisions to
respect federal labor law and Board orders arising thereunder when private employers are involved. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees; Div. 1287 v.
Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.
Rav. 1337 (1972); Cox, Federalismin the Law of LaborRelations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954).
64. After the test was adopted, the Board held that the degree of control analysis did not have
to be applied prior to the intimate connection analysis because either analysis provided sufficient
grounds for declining jurisdiction. See Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975); Current Constr. Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 718 (1974).
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subdivision. 65 Moreover, none of the decisions applying the test ex-

plain why the nature of the service provided to a political subdivision
65. The other major difficulty with the intimate connection test was that it required the Board
to determine whether the control retained by the employer was "sufficient" to allow effective bargaining to occur. The difficulties involved in making this determination continue to plague the
Board. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
A series of cases involving private employers who provided food service to exempt educational institutions illustrate the inconsistencies that occurred when the Board attempted to identify
whether a particular service was "essential." In Crotty Bros., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964), and Slater
Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1972), the Board held that the employers' provision of food services
was intimately related to the purpose of the private colleges involved and granted an exemption to
the employers. In a later case, the Board reversed its earlier position and refused to grant an
exemption to an employer providing food service to an exempt school district. JA-CE Co., 205
N.L.R.B. 578 (1973). The employer in JA-CE provided food service to a public school district,
rather than a college or university as in the earlier cases; this is not a significant distinction, however, because the provision of food service is no more essential to the purpose of a college than to
the purpose of a high school or a grade school. Nonetheless, the Board relied on the intimate
connection test to distinguish the cases.
The Board's application of the intimate connection test has produced inconsistent results in
other areas. Compare Wackenhut Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 86 (1973) (declining to assert jurisdiction
over an employer providing guard service to a city college) with Atlas Guard Serv., 237 N.L.R.B.
1067 (1978) (asserting jurisdiction over an employer providing guard service to the General Services Administration); compare Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975) (declining to
assert jurisdiction over an employer providing fire protection to a municipality) with Sis-Q Flying
Serv., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 195 (1972) (asserting jurisdiction over an employer providing forest fire
fighting assistance to various governmental forest services).
The following cases indicate services the Board has deemed "essential" to the purpose of
various political subdivisions: R & E Transit, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 959 (1977) (school bus transportation); Camptown Bus Lines, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 4 (1976) (school bus transportation); Roesch
Lines, 224 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976) (school bus transportation); ARA Servs. Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 64
(1975) (auto-fleet maintenance); Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975) (fire protection); Current Constr. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 718 (1974) (providing park maintenance); Wackenhut
Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 86 (1973) (guard service).
The following cases indicate services the Board has found nonessential to the purpose of the
exempt entity: Highview, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1977) (operation ofgovernment owned nursing
homes), a.f'd in part, remanded in part, 590 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1979); Nichols Sanitation, 230
N.L.R.B. 73 (1977) (providing trash removal to a municipality); California Inspection Rating Bureau, 215 N.L.R.B. 780 (1974) (performing statewide workmen's compensation insurance rating
for a state commission), enforced, 591 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 943 (1979); TransEast Air, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 185 (1971) (operating an airport for a municipality); Richmond of
NJ., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 820 (1967) (providing maintenance service to exempt hospital).
Although the Board's characterization of the services listed above as essential or nonessential
may have been correct in any given case, its decisions, when considered collectively, provide no
hint that the cases were decided under a single standard. For example, there is no readily identifiable logical process that leads to the conclusion that the provision ofpark maintenance is essential
to the purpose of a municipality, but that the provision of health care is not. Compare, e.g.,
Current Constr. Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 718 (1974) (park maintenance) with Highview, Inc., 231
N.L.R.B. 1251 (1977), af'dinpart,remandedinpart,590 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1979) (health care). In
response to the Board's assertion that the provision of nursing home care is not a traditional
government function, and therefore not intimately related to the purpose of an exempt county,
Judge Thornberry of the Fifth Circuit replied that
[t]he care of the aged, the sick, and the indigent is a traditional function of government.
As a matter of history, the Board's finding is incorrect since the breakdown of the ecclesiastical duty and the advent of the Old Poor Law (1601). Certainly, no one moderately
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by a private employer is relevant to the determination of whether the
affected employees should be afforded the benefits of the Act, when the
66
Act makes no mention of this consideration.

Acting Chairman Fanning first expressed disagreement with the

theoretical basis of the intimate connection test in a dissent filed in RuralFireProtection Co. .67 Fanning stated that the relationship between
the service provided by a private employer and an exempt entity's pur-

pose was a consideration relevant only to determining the degree of
control exercised by the exempt entity over the employer's labor rela-

tions.68 According to Fanning, the degree of control exercised over the
private employer's employment relationship was the essential element

in establishing an "intimate connection" between the employer and the
exempt entity.69 In essence, Fanning argued that the "intimate connec-

tion" was a conclusory label that attached when the private employer
possessed an insufficient amount of control for effective bargaining to
occur.

Fanning's criticism of the intimate connection test slowly gained
favor among other Board members. Member Jenkins, who voted with
the majority in RuralFireProtection, sided with Members Fanning and
Murphy in BDM Services Co. ,70 a case in which the Board asserted
aware of our history, our traditions, and our ideals can argue that this care is not a
"traditional" function of government.
590 F.2d at 178. The court nevertheless upheld the Board's decision, because the Board had exercised its discretion consistently. Id at 179.
66. See National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1979). See infra note 79. The
stated purpose of the Act is
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
. . . by encouraging. . . collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment.
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). These goals cannot be met by a test that does not give express
consideration to its impact upon the rights of employees, which the intimate connection test failed
to do.
67. 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975) (Fanning, Acting Chairman, dissenting). For other expressions

of Fanning's dissatisfaction with the intimate connection test, see Columbia Transit Corp.. 226
N.L.R.B. 812 (1976) (Fanning, Member, dissenting); Teledyne Economic Dev. Co., 223 N.L.R.B.
1040 (1976) (Fanning, Member, dissenting); Grey Nuns of the Sacred Heart, 221 N.L.R.B. 1215,
1215 n.2 (1975).
68. 216 N.L.R.B. at 587.
69. Id
70. 218 N.L.R.B. 1191 (1975). In BDM, the employer provided technical assistance to the
Army under an award fee contract. The Army had the power to specify the "type of people to be
employed, to inspect the credentials of the employees involved, and to determine the number of
man-hours to be alloted the work." Id at 1191. The majority held that because the Army had
only limited control over the employees labor relations, an intimate connection was not present.
Id at 1192. In fact, the majority applied the intimate connection test in the manner that Fanning
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jurisdiction over an employer providing technical assistance to the
Army.
Following the appointment of Member Truesdale, the Board decided several cases that placed the continuing validity of the intimate
connection test in doubt.7 ' In the leading case of Chicago Youth Centers72 the Board asserted jurisdiction over a nonprofit corporation operating Headstart and other day-care programs pursuant to a contract
negotiated with a city agency. The Board rejected the employer's contention that the intimate connection test was satisfied, holding that daycare was not an "essential municipal service that a city would normally
be required to provide." 73 Although the majority's holding implied
that the test had continuing validity, Member Truesdale indicated that
he, like Chairman Fanning, did not adhere to the intimate connection
test.74 Significantly, no Board decisions following Chicago Youth Centers relied on the intimate connection test to exempt a private employer
75
from the Board's jurisdiction.
2. The Right of Control Test. The Board did not expressly overrule the intimate connection test until 1979, when it decided National
had suggested in his dissent in Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584 (1975), examining the
control exercised by the exempt entity to see if an intimate connection existed. The majority did
not find, however, that the services provided by the private employer were not essential to the
purpose of the Army, though such a finding would have been necessary for the Board to assert
jurisdiction under the intimate connection test as set forth in Rural FireProtection.
Member Murphy's position in DDM appeared to indicate her disagreement with the intimate
connection test; however, she subsequently supported the test. See National Transp. Serv., Inc.,
240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979); Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 235 N.L.R.B. 776 (1978) rev'dsub nom.,
NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lexington Taxi Corp., 224
N.L.R.B. 503 (1976); Roesch Lines, 224 N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
The other Board members who clearly supported the use of the intimate connection test at the
time ADM was decided were Members Kennedy and Pennello. 218 N.L.R.B. at 1193-95 (Pennello and Kennedy, Members, dissenting).
71. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 235 N.L.R.B. 776 (1978); Hull House Ass'n, 235
N.L.R.B. 797 (1978); Chase House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 792 (1978); Young Women's Christian
Ass'n, 235 N.L.R.B. 788 (1978); consolidated& rev'dsub nom., NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers,
616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980). The above cases each involved the same city agency providing
funding to the various employers on the same terms.
72. 235 N.L.R.B. at 776. The Board's decision in CatholicBishop of Chicago is referred to as
Chicago Youth Centers, see supra note 70, which is the name of the case on appeal, see supra note
71, to distinguish the case from Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 1112 (1977),
aftd, 940 U.S. 490 (1978), which dealt with unrelated issues.
73. 235 N.L.R.B. at 779.
74. Id at 779 n.14. ("Member Truesdale agrees that the Head Start and Day Care centers
here are not intimately connected to the exempt operations of the City. In any event, however,
like Chairman Fanning, Member Truesdale would not adhere to the intimate connection test.")
75. This is not to say that employers did not attempt to avoid the Board's jurisdiction by
relying on the intimate connection test after Chicago Youth Centers. See, e.g., Mon Valley United
Health Serv., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 916 (1978); Mental Health Management, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 98
(1978); Alcoholism Servs. of Erie County, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 927 (1978).
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Transportation Services, Inc.76 In National Transportation, an employer that provided school bus transportation to public school systems

argued that it should be granted a discretionary exemption.7 7 Although
prior Board decisions had held consistently that bus transportation for

school children was intimately related to the purpose of school systems,78 . the Board refused to apply the intimate connection test.7 9 Over
the vigorous dissents of Members Murphy and Penello, the Board de-

nounced the intimate connection test as vague and difficult to apply,
and emphasized that the connection between the purpose of the entity

and the service provided by the employer was unrelated to the "employer's ability to bargain effectively."'80 The Board replaced the intimate connection test with the "right of control" test.81 This test
requires the Board to "determine whether the employer itself meets the
definition of 'employer' in Section 2(2) of the Act, and if so, determine
76. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
77. Id at 565.
78. See R & E Transit, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 959 (1977); Camptown Bus Lines, 226 N.L.R.B. 4
(1976); Waukegan-North Chicago Transit Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 833 (1976); Roesch Lines, 224
N.L.R.B. 203 (1976).
In at least two cases in which the Board exempted employers providing school bus transportation, it reasoned that because the school districts were statutorily mandated to provide bus service,
the school districts would themselves be obligated to perform the service if a private contractor
were not hired. Therefore, the Board concluded that the contractor should be viewed as standing
in the place of the exempt school districts. Columbia Transit Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 812, 815 n.8
(1976). Accord Transit Systems, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975). Under the reasoning of Columbia
Transit, any private employer who provided a service to an exempt entity would be exempted
from the Board's jurisdiction if the exempt entity was statutorily required to provide the particular
service, even if the private employer had absolute control over the employment relationship and
the service provided was one which the entity could easily perform itself, such as trash removal.
The Board contradicted the Columbia Transit holding in National Maritime Union of Am.,
227 N.L.R.B. 20 (1976), in which the Board asserted jurisdiction over a corporation that provided
transportation between the United States and Puerto Rico under an agreement with a Puerto
Rican government agency that was statutorily required to provide such transportation. The Board
expressly rejected the Columbia Transit rationale in California Inspection Rating Bureau, 231
N.L.R.B. 520 (1977). The Board denied ever having held that "because a function or service is
mandated by state statutes or legislature the work in question per se becomes intimately connected
with the State." Id at 510.
The Board recognized the contradiction represented by these cases in National Transp. Serv.,
240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 n.7 (1979) (discussing both National Maritime Union and Columbia
Transit).
79. National Transp. Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1979). The Board discussed briefly the
legislative history of section 14(c)(1), which provides the basis for the Board's discretion to decline
to assert its jurisdiction, noting: "nothing in the legislative history. .. indicates any congressional
intent that the Board decline to assert jurisdiction over any employer solely because of the relationship between the services it provides to an exempt entity and the purposes of such entity." Id
at 565 (footnote omitted).
80. 240 N.L.R.B. at 566. The Board also noted that the test required a "meticulous and, in
our view, superfluous analysis of the facts" Id
81. Id
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whether the employer has sufficient control over the employment conditions of its employees to enable it to bargain with a labor organization as their representative."8 2 Applying the new standard to the facts
in NationalTransportation,the Board found that the employer was not
entitled to a discretionary exemption. 3 Although the exempt school
districts controlled some aspects of the employment relationship, the
bus company retained significant control over "hiring, firing, supervision, discipline, work assignments, . . . [and] the conferring of bene-

fits."8s4 Because the employer controlled these aspects of the
employment relationship, the Board found that the employer retained
85
sufficient control to bargain and therefore asserted jurisdiction.
Although the right of control test is but a simplification of the intimate connection test, it substantially limits the occasions when the
Board will grant the discretionary exemption and results in increased
assertion ofjurisdiction by the Board. The preliminary step of the right
of control test, which requires the Board to determine whether the employer meets the statutory definition of "employer, ' 86 serves only to
establish the Board's statutory jurisdiction; 87 as such, it was implicit in
the intimate connection test.88 Both the old and new tests next ask
whether the employer retains a sufficient degree of control over its employment relationship to bargain with a labor organization, and both
tests grant an exemption to an employer who lacks such control.8 9 If
the employer possesses a sufficient degree of control to enable it to bargain, however, the tests may produce different results. Under the right
of control test, if the employer exercises the requisite degree of control,
the Board will assert jurisdiction. This was not necessarily the result
under the intimate connection test; even if the employer retained sufficient control, the Board exempted an employer from its jurisdiction if
the services provided to an exempt employer were "essential" to the
entity's "purpose." 90 Thus, the right of control test narrows the occa82. Id at 565.
83. The Board presumably reached this conclusion by applying the Natural Gas test. See

supra text accompanying note 31.
84.
85.
86.
87.

240 N.L.R.B. at 566.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 82.
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.

88. Application of a discretionary standard, whether it is the intimate connection test or the
right of control test, is unnecessary unless the Board possesses statutory jurisdiction, which can be
waived at its discretion. Thus, the Board must possess statutory jurisdiction to apply either discretionary test.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82 for a formulation of the right of control test,
and see supra text accompanying notes 63-64 for a formulation of the intimate connection test.
90. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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sions in which a discretionary exemption will be granted because it
omits the last step of the intimate connection test;91 employers that
would have been granted a discretionary exemption will instead be
subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
The right of control test is clearly an improvement over the intimate connection test because it eliminates the need for the Board to
engage in the unnecessary practice of determining whether a given
service is "essential" to an entity's purpose. 92 The new test is not without problems, however. The Board still must determine whether an
employer's control over its employment relationship is sufficient to enable it to bargain effectively with a labor organization. 93 To isolate a
specific group of characteristics that constitute "control" is difficult.
Factors such as the employer's control over hiring, firing, discipline,
work assignments and the conferring of benefits are certainly relevant
aspects of control, 94 but these factors should be considered in the context of the employer's entire operation. For example, a private employer operating a hospital for a political subdivision might be required
by the operating agreement to hire only experienced nurses as a means
of insuring quality patient care. Although the political subdivision
may set such a hiring qualification, or insist on the discharge of a nurse
who does not meet the qualification, it does not necessarily follow that
the private. employer lacks sufficient control over the employment relationship to enable it to bargain. The private employer still can decide
who will be hired and define the terms of employment. Similarly, if the
political subdivision imposes a limit on the amount of expenses it will
reimburse, the private employer is necessarily limited in the range of
benefits it can confer. Such limitations on expenditures, however, cannot be said to limit substantially the employer's control over the employment relationship; all enterprises face some economic restraints,
and the private employer in the example can determine the benefits it
will confer within its budgetary limits.
Thus, the right of control test is potentially as susceptible to inconsistent application as was the intimate connection test, for the Board
can easily overemphasize those aspects of control that support its ultimate conclusion either to assert or decline jurisdiction. The sufficiency
of control determination requires consideration of all aspects of the em91. This is the result Fanning urged in his dissent in RuralFireProtection. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.

92. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying note 82.
94. See, e.g., D. T. Watson Home for Crippled Children, 242 N.L.RLB. 1368 (1979); National
Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
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ployer's operations, so the Board must determine which factors are relevant to the issue of the employer's control. Because the test does not
specify the choice or weight of the factors to be considered in the sufficiency of control determination, the Board must make a case by case
analysis, which increases the probability of inconsistent decisions. The
Board's application of the right of control test, however, may turn out
to be much more consistent than its application of the intimate connection test, particularly if in close cases the Board continues to favor use
of the statutory exemption of the NaturalGas test over granting discre95
tionary exemptions.
II.

THE COURTS: EXPANDING THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
EXEMPTION BY INFRINGING UPON THE BOARD'S
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY

Since the Board's narrowing of the discretionary exemption, several of its decisions to assert jurisdiction have been overturned in the
federal courts of appeals. 96 The cases reversing the Board indicate that
some courts have confused the Board's statutory jurisdiction with its
discretionary authority to assert or decline jurisdiction in cases in
which statutory jurisdiction exists. As a result, the courts have mistakenly relied on the joint employer concept 97 and the presence of a prior
approval clause 98 to reverse Board decisions under the guise of statutory interpretation, rather than giving deference to the Board's exercise
of its discretion. The effect of these court decisions has been to preclude the Board from asserting jurisdiction, thereby extinguishing the
rights otherwise afforded the affected employees by section 7 of the
Act. 99
95. See infra note 145. Recent changes in the Board's membership may also affect the future
application of the right of control test. See 107 LAD. RE.. RE'. (BNA) 319 (1981).
96. See NLRB v. Board of Trustees, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Chicago Youth
Centers, 611 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.
1979).
The Board's narrowing of the discretionary exemption culminated when it adopted the right
of control test to replace the intimate connection test, but the narrowing process began before the
intimate connection test was expressly rejected. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of the joint employer concept see infra notes 100-21 and accompanying
text.
98. For a discussion of the prior approval clause see infra notes 122-42 and accompanying
text.
99. The rights afforded employees by section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), include the right to
strike and the right to bargain collectively through representatives chosen by the employees. See
supra note 2 for the text of section 7.
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The Joint Employer Problem.
The courts have erroneously applied the joint employer concept to

reverse Board decisions asserting jurisdiction over private employers. 100 A joint employer relationship exists when two or more employers exert significant control over the same group of employees.' 0o
When such a relationship exists between an employer and a political

subdivision, the Board has usually exempted the employer from its jurisdiction. 0 2 The Board has reasoned that collective bargaining is not
feasible in such a situation because any bargaining would directly af-

fect the political subdivision, a result contrary to the policy of the
Act.103 The Board apparently felt that it would risk possible conflict
with the authority of the political subdivision.1°4
In Lutheran Welfare Services v. NLRB,10 5 the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction
over an employer that provided day-care services pursuant to a contract with a city agency. The court found that the employer and the

city agency were joint employers and held that the Board lacked jurisdiction, stating: "The Board has... held that it has no jurisdiction
over joint employers if one of the employers is exempt from the Act,
since a collective bargaining agreement is not feasible in such
circumstances."

106

The Board's decisions involving its discretion, however, do not
support the court's conclusion that the Board lacked jurisdiction over
joint employers.10 7 In none of the three cases cited by the court in Lu100. When the courts hold that the Board lacks statutory jurisdiction over an employing entity
because the entity does not meet the definition of "employer" set forth in section 2(2) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976 & Supp. II 1979), the employees of that entity receive none of the Act's
protections. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
101. See, eg., NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978); Transportation
Lease Serv., Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 95 (1977). A conflict exists concerning the appropriate test for
determining joint employer status between two private employers. See Miscellaneous Drivers &
Helpers Union, Local No. 610 v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1980). In the context of the
political subdivision exemption, the joint employer concept has been limited to analyzing only the
control over a private employer's labor relations possessed by an exempt entity. See cases cited
infra at note 102.
102. See, ag., ARA Serv., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 64 (1975); Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.RLB. 528
(1973). But see Vantage Petroleum Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1980); Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 218
N.L.R.B. 1090 (1975); JA-CE Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 578 (1973).
103. Because political subdivisions are expressly excluded from the Board's jurisdiction by
section 2(2), direct Board involvement with a political subdivision through its relationship with a
private employer is arguably contrary to the policy of the Act.
104. See Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973). See supra note 63.
105. 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979).
106. Id at 778.
107. The Lutheran Wefare court also failed to give due consideration to the legislative history
of the political subdivision exemption and to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the exemption.
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theran Welfare did the Board hold that it lacked jurisdiction.10 8 In
each case, the Board had instead declined to assert jurisdiction over
private employers that had close relationships with political subdivisions,109 a determination that could be made only if the Board possessed statutory jurisdiction initially.1 0
If the Lutheran Wefare court's holding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over joint employers is accepted, the Board's discretionary jurisdiction over employers who contract with political subdivisions will
be seriously eroded."' The court declared that a joint employer relaThe scant legislative history does not suggest that Congress even considered the possibility that a
private employer could qualify for the exemption. See Hearingson Labor DisputesAct be/ore the
House Comm on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1934) (address of Sen. Copeland); 93 Coto.
Rac. 6441 (1947) (consideration of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947) (statements of
Sen. Taft). The legislative history makes clear that one reason Congress included the exemption
was that public employees generally lacked the right to strike. See NLRB v. Natural Gas Util.
Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 604 (1971). Congress's recognition of this fact provides no basis for concluding that the statutory exemption should extend to private employers; if the Board asserts jurisdiction, the affected employees are guaranteed the right to strike by section 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976). Thus, the right to strike flows from the Board's jurisdictional determination, and
therefore cannot be considered a measure of the Board's jurisdiction. The legislative history also
discloses that the present version of the exemption differs from that originally presented to the
Senate, which exempted "any State, municipal corporation or other governmental instrumentality." See Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1934). The present version's use of
"political subdivision," 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976), rather than "governmental instrumentalities" arguably reflects an intent to narrow the exemption. Such a construction is purely speculative, however, because there is no evidence that Congress was cognizant of the change. See NLRB v.
Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 604 (1971).
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the political subdivision exemption in Natural Gas
similarly provides no basis for extending the statutory exemption to private employers. The characteristics considered by the Court in addition to the "created by the state or administered by
persons responsible to public officials" test are not characteristics typically possessed by a private
employer.
108. Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979). The cases cited by the
court in support of its conclusion that the Board lacked jurisdiction over joint employers were
Mississippi City Lines, 223 N.L.R.B. 11 (1976); Transit Systems, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 299 (1975) and
Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973).
109. The Board relied expressly on the intimate connection test as the basis for exempting the
employer in Mississippi City Lines, 223 N.L.R.B. at 300, and in Transit Systems, Inc., 221
N.L.R.B. at 11. In Ohio Inns, the Board found that the employer and the state were joint employers, and held that "[s]ince the state is exempt from the Board's jurisdiction under Section 2(2) of
the Act, we find it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein." 205
N.L.R.B. at 528-29. Thus, in each of the cases cited by the Lutheran We/are court, the Board
explicitly declined to assert its jurisdiction, contrary to the courts' assertion that the Board had
held that it lacked jurisdiction.
110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
111. The Board applied the intimate connection test when it asserted jurisdiction in Lutheran
Welfare Serv., 236 N.L.R.B. 106 (1978), but the Seventh Circuit's rationale for reversing the Board
applies equally to the discretionary right of control test. The court held that the employer was
exempt because the Board lacks jurisdiction over an employer who is a joint employer with an
exempt political subdivision, which the court held the employer to be in this case. 607 F.2d at 778.
The court focused on the political subdivision's control over the employer's operations, which is
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tionship exists when an exempt entity exercises significant control over
a private employer's employees. 1 2 The right of control test, which is
the accepted discretionary standard,1 13 asks whether the private employer retains sufficient control over its employment relationship to enable it to bargain with a labor organization.1 4 Therefore, both the
joint employer analysis and the right of control test focus on control

over the employment relationship. The only difference between the
standards is that the right of control test examines the private em-

ployer's control while the joint employer standard considers the political subdivision's control. 1 5 Thus, if the joint employer standard
measures the Board's statutory jurisdiction, it follows that the right of

control test would also be a measure of statutory jurisdiction. This conclusion, however, would deprive the Board of all discretionary jurisdic-

tion in the political subdivision context. Under the Lutheran Welfare
court's rationale, if a political subdivision exercises the requisite control

to establish a joint employer relationship, the Board lacks jurisdiction.
Furthermore, if the employer retains sufficient control to avoid classifi-

cation as a joint employer, the right of control test prescribes that the
Board assert its jurisdiction."

6

The Board would therefore have no

reason to exercise its discretionary authority to exempt employers from
a result contrary to the grant of discretion of section
its jurisdiction,
7
14(c)(1).11

the common denominator between the right of control test and the intimate connection test. See
supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. Thus, the joint employer rationale for exempting the
private employer applies in either situation.
The remaining portion of this note analyzes the impact of the joint employer rationale on the
Board's discretionary jurisdiction as determined by the right of control test. For the reasons noted
above, however, the discussion is equally applicable to the intimate connection test.
112. 607 F.2d at 778.
113. See National Transp. Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 n.9 (1979). Accord Truman Medical
Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Austin Developmental Center, Inc.,
606 F.2d 785, 790 nn. 9 & 10 (7th Cir. 1979).
114. See supra text accompanying note 82.
115. By a tortuous construction of the language, one might contrast the "sufficient control" of
the right of control test with the "significant control" of the joint employer standard and theorize
that an employer might retain so little control that he is unable to bargain effectively, but still
retain enough control that joint employer status does not exist. Conversely, one might envision a
situation where enough control could be retained to enable the employer to bargain though the
exempt entity possessed enough control to establish joint employer status. Such theoretical distinctions are of no practical value, however, because the principal difficulty with both standards is
a lack of precision, and the defect is only magnified by injecting additional gradations into a scale
measuring an unquantifiable variable such as "control."
116. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976) ("The Board ... may ... decline to assert jurisdiction
over any ... class ... of employers. . . ."). For the full text of section 14(c)(l), see supra note
51. Under the joint employer rationale, the Board retains a measure of discretion in exercising its
jurisdiction-it could decline to assert jurisdiction over employers possessing any relationship
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The Lutheran Welfare court's holding that the Board lacked statutory jurisdiction over the employer involved therein would have been

correct as a matter of law had the employer qualified as a political subdivision.' 18 The court admitted that the employer did not qualify independently as a political subdivision,' t9 however, so the Board actually
possessed statutory jurisdiction. Thus, the court should have deter-

mined only whether the Board acted within its discretionary authority.
Had the court properly viewed the Board's decision as an exercise of
discretion, the decision would not have been reversed, because the
Board's action did not depart "substantially from that taken in seemingly like cases."1 20 Thus, the court's use of the wrong standard of re-

view resulted in an unwarranted expansion of the political subdivision
with an exempt entity. Nevertheless, the joint employer rationale deprives the Board of its discretion to assert jurisdiction over employers in cases in which discretion is most needed: those cases
in which employers are closely related to exempt entities and present a colorable claim for exemption. When employers in this position are involved, the Board needs the flexibility to decide
whether a claim is valid in a particular case. The joint employer rationale destroys this flexibility
by preventing the Board from exercising discretion.
118. See NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971). See supra notes 2-4 and
accompanying text.
119. The employer did not qualify as a political subdivision under the NaturalGas test because it was neither created by the state nor administered by individuals responsible to elected
public officials. See Lutheran We/fare, 607 F.2d at 778. See supra text accompanying note 31.
120. See Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The standard of
review for cases in which the Board has exercised its discretionary authority has also been phrased
as whether the Board treated "similar situations in dissimilar ways." Herbert Harvey, Inc. v.
NLRB, 385 F.2d 684, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (janitorial services). Accord NLRB v. Highview, Inc.,
590 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir.), modfed on other grounds, 595 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1979) (nursing
homes). See supra note 51.
The court of appeals in Lutheran Welfare could not have found that the Board treated similar situations dissimilarly or that its action departed substantially from that taken in seemingly
like cases. 607 F.2d at 777. When the Board decided the Lutheran We/fare case, it had already
decided several cases involving government-funded day-care centers operated by private employers. See Chicago Youth Centers, 235 N.L.R.B. 776 (1978); Hull House Ass'n., 235 N.L.R.B. 797
(1978); Chase House, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 797 (1978); Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 235
N.L.R.B. 788 (1978), consolidated& rev'd sub nonz NLRB v. Chicago Youth Centers, 616 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit heard the Lutheran Welfare case before the Chicago
Youth Centers case, and relied on Lutheran Welfare as precedent when it reversed the Board in
Chicago Youth Centers. In the Chicago Youth Centers cases, the Board had asserted jurisdiction
over the employers, who had contracted with the same city agency that was involved in Lutheran
Welfare. 235 N.L.R.B. 797. The Board treated the employer in Lutheran Welfare in the same
manner as it had the similarly situated employers in Chicago Youth Centers. Hence, the reviewing
court in Lutheran Welfare could not have held that the Board abused its discretion by treating
similar cases in a dissimilar manner. Moreover, even if the Board had previously exempted private employers operating government-funded day-care centers, the Board could have legitimately
reversed its prior position and asserted jurisdiction, as long as subsequent cases were treated in a
similar fashion. See NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 264 (1975) (Board decisions to
exercise jurisdiction where previously declined is appropriate in light of the Board's responsibility
to constantly reform its standards on the basis of accumulated experience).
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exemption at the expense of employees entitled to the protection of the
Act. 121
B.

The "PriorApproval" Clause.
A problem closely related to the joint employer issue arises when

an employer and a political subdivision execute a contract providing
that the employer will secure prior approval of any collective bargain-

ing agreement it negotiates. In several cases decided prior to the
Board's clash with the Seventh Circuit over joint employers,

122

the

Board exempted from its jurisdiction employers whose contracts required prior approval of collective bargaining agreements. 123 The na-

ture of this determination would be altered, however, by the adoption
of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the joint employer standard as
a statutory test.124 If a political subdivision had the right to disapprove
a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a private employer, the
employer and the political subdivision would clearly qualify as joint
employers because the political subdivision would possess a significant
amount of control over the employer's operations. 125 Applying the rea-

soning of the court in Lutheran Welfare, the Board would lack statutory
jurisdiction, and would therefore lack discretion to exercise jurisdiction

when employers attempt to circumvent the Board's authority.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Board of Trustees v. NLRB 26 illustrates the potential for abuse fostered by such reasoning. The Board

of Trustees case involved a private, nonprofit employer that contracted
with the Board of Trustees of a county-owned hospital to operate the

hospital independently.1 27 Following the Board's certification of a bar121. Once the Board declines to assert jurisdiction over an employer, the employer's employees are not granted the protections of the Act; the employees' rights are governed by applicable
state law. See NLRA § 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1976) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be
deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State... from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines. . . to assert jurisdiction.").
122. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; see also supra note 120 for the cases in which
the Seventh Circuit relied on the joint employer rationale to reverse the Board.
123. See MTL, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1976); Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.RB. 528 (1973).
124. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
125. The joint employer rationale, as set forth in Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. N.L.R.B., 607
F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979), considers whether the exempt entity exercises significant control over the
private employer's operations. A collective bargaining agreement may have a pervasive impact on
an employer's operations; thus, if an exempt entity has the right of prior approval over any collective bargaining agreement the employer negotiates, the exempt entity exercises significant control
over the employer's operations.
126. 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
127. See Bishop Randall Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1975), rev'dsub nonz Board of Trustees v.
NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980). The Board of Trustees, appointed by the county commissioners, was found to be a political subdivision. Bishop Randall Hosp., 233 N.L.R.B. 441, 443
(1977). The Board's latter Bishop Randall decision involved unfair labor practice proceedings.
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gaining agent for the private employer's employees, the trustees met
with the employer and amended the contract to provide that the employer would not enter into a collective bargaining agreement without
the prior approval of the trustees. 128 In an unfair labor practice proceeding resulting from the employer's alleged refusal to bargain after
the amendments were executed, the Board rejected the employer's contention that the amendments established the trustees as the true employer of the hospital employees. 129 The Board held that the
130
amendments should be given no effect.
On the employer's petition to set aside a Board bargaining order,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the Board's decision.1 31 The court concluded that the amendments were valid and that
the Board had erred by not giving them full effect. 132 The court also
held that the effect of the amendments was to make the employer and
the Board of Trustees joint employers, and that the employer was
therefore exempt from the Board's jurisdiction by the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit's Lutheran Welfare decision. 33
By upholding the validity of the amendments executed by the employer and the trustees, the Tenth Circuit created a means by which
employers can avoid the Board's jurisdiction. If an agreement vesting
the right of prior approval of collective bargaining agreements in an
exempt entity is all that is required for an employer to gain exemption
from the Board's jurisdiction, this provision will probably become a
standard clause in contracts between a private employer and a political
subdivision. This result is clearly contrary to the purpose of the Act
34
because it enables employers to escape the Board's jurisdiction.
128. 233 N.L.R.B. at 445. The significant portion ofthe prior approval amendment stated that
the employer would continue to operate the hospital "subject to the control reserved to the lessor
[trustees]" and that the employer "could not enter into any. . . collective agreement without the
express written consent of the lessor." Id At the same time the amendments were executed the

Trusties adopted a resolution ordering the employer to refrain from bargaining with the newly
certified union. Id at 446.
129. 233 N.L.R.B. 441, 446 (1977).

130. Id at 446. The Board stated that an employer "may not circumvent the issuance of an
order designed to remedy its conduct violative of the Act by interposing a contract it has entered."
Id
131. Board of Trustees v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980).

132. Id at 184.
133. Id at 189.
134. Section 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), states its underlying policies and recognizes
that "[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some

employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes. . . which have the...
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce." The Act goes on to state that it is the policy of the
United States to eliminate these obstructions by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-

organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing."

Such goals clearly can-
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Although the Board of Trustees court relied in part on the joint

employer rationale of Lutheran Welfare to conclude that the Board
lacked jurisdiction,13 5 the difficulties created by a prior approval clause

can arise even if a court properly applies the joint employer standard as
a discretionary standard.' 36 Enforcing a prior approval clause grants
control to an exempt entity such that the right of control test requires
the Board to decline to assert jurisdiction. 137 Thus, the assertion of discretionary jurisdiction turns on whether the prior approval clause is

given effect.
If a prior approval clause may be given effect at all,

38

the decision

to do so is properly within the Board's discretion, not the discretion of
the courts of appeals. Assuming that the Board possesses statutory jurisdiction over an employer,

39

the decision to assert that jurisdiction is

not be realized if the employer has the option of subjecting himself to the Board's jurisdiction or
avoiding it; few employers would voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
135. Board of Trustees v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 184 (10th Cir. 1980); see Lutheran Welfare
Serv. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1979). The court also cited NLRB v. Chicago Youth
Centers, 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980), and Ohio Inns, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 528 (1973), to support its
contention that the Board has no jurisdiction over an employer that is a joint employer with a
political subdivision. 624 F.2d at 189. The fallacies underlying this conclusion are discussed
supra at notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
According to the court of appeals in Boardof Trustees, the principal ground for reversing the
Board was that the Board erred in holding that the employer retained control over the employment relationship. 624 F.2d at 189. Because the court concluded that the amendments established
conclusively that substantial control was vested in the Trustees, it held that the Board's decision to
the contrary was not supported by the record. Id This result follows from the court's conclusion
that the Board's ruling that the amendments were invalid was "not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole," id at 188, which is the standard imposed by the Act for reversing
the Board's findings of fact. See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). The court erred by
reversing the Board on this ground because the Board's ultimate decision to assert jurisdiction was
within its discretion: the outcome-determinative issue of the amendment's validity was necessarily
a discretionary determination by the Board, rather than a finding of fact. Thus, the proper inquiry
for the court was whether the Board treated similar cases differently. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
136. The reasons that the joint employer rationale is properly considered to be a discretionary
standard are set forth at supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
Because the court used the joint employer concept as an alternative rationale, the problems
created by giving effect to a prior approval clause can arise without resort to the joint employer
rationale.
137. If the joint employer analysis dictates that the Board decline to assert jurisdiction, the
right of control test will necessarily yield the same conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes
116-17.
138. Because this note argues that the statutory NaturalGas test, rather than the discretionary
exemption, should be used in the political subdivision context, only those entities that qualify
independently as political subdivisions would be exempt from the Board's jurisdiction. Thus, the
existence of a prior approval clause would be immaterial.
139. This assumption is based on an interpretation of section 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976),
as depriving the Board ofjurisdiction only if the employing entity is expressly exempt. See supra
note 4 for the text of section 2(2). Because a private employer cannot meet the NaturalGas test to
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necessarily within the Board's discretion.1 40 When a court holds that
the Board must give deference to a prior approval clause by declining
to exercise its jurisdiction, the court effectively substitutes its discretion
for the Board's discretion. This result is inconsistent with the grant of
jurisdictional discretion given the Board by section 14(c)(1) of the
Act.' 4 ' Moreover, the Board must retain the power to prevent wholesale avoidance of its jurisdiction by employers that would include such
a clause in all contracts with political subdivisions.' 42 If the Board's
jurisdiction can be manipulated by employers, the Board cannot effectively protect the rights of private sector employees.
III.

CONCLUSION

Recent court decisions indicate that the courts have ignored the
Board's discretionary authority in political subdivision cases. In Lutheran Wefare, the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction was disregarded completely in decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit holding that the employer was exempt from the Board's jurisdiction even though the employer did not qualify as a political subdivision under either component of the Natural Gas test.' 43 In Board of
Trustees, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a prior
approval clause in the contract between an employer and a political
subdivision precluded the Board from asserting jurisdiction despite the
fact that the decision to give effect to the clause was properly within the
Board's discretion. 44
The magnitude of the courts' errors is illustrated by the fact that
the Board has not granted a discretionary exemption under the right of
control test to any employer within its statutory jurisdiction under the
NaturalGas test.' 45 Thus, the effect of the courts' decisions has been to
qualify as a political subdivision, the employer cannot be statutorily exempt from the Board's
jurisdiction.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 49-5 1.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976). For the text of section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA, see supra note

51.
142. If a prior approval clause is all that is required to prevent the Board from exercising its
jurisdiction, then those employers who contract with political subdivisions will have a powerful

anti-union weapon not available to employers who operate solely in the private sector.
143. See supra text accompanying note 31.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.

145. In those cases in which the Board found that the political subdivision .completely controlled the employing entity, the Board held that the employing entity qualified as a political

subdivision under the NaturalGas test. See Northhampton Center for Children & Families, Inc.,
257 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1981); New York Inst. for the Educ. of the Blind, 254 N.L.R.B. 664 (1981);
Madison County Mental Health Center, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 258 (1980); Community Health &
Home Care, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 509 (1980); Northern Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 241
N.L.R.B. 323 (1979).
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deny the protections of the Act to employees of employers over which
the Board asserted its discretionary jurisdiction after
determining that
146
the employer was within its statutory jurisdiction.
The obvious solution to this problem is for the courts to yield to
the Board's legitimate exercise of its discretion and determine only
whether the Board exceeded the bounds of its statutory jurisdiction, as
determined by the NaturalGas test. 147 The Board could help alleviate
the confusion in the federal courts of appeals by relying solely on the
Natural Gas test and asserting jurisdiction in political subdivision cases
over all employers that fall within its statutory jurisdiction. Because
the discretionary right of control test is substantially encompassed by
the statutory Natural Gas test,148 the Board could simply discard the
right of control test. The Board's results would not be altered by taking
this step, as evidenced by the complete absence of cases in which the
Board has granted a discretionary exemption after applying the right of
control test and by the Board's exclusive use of the NaturalGas test to
exempt entities since the adoption of the right of control test.' 49 If the
Board should expressly discard the discretionary exemption in political
subdivision cases, the courts might of course continue to misconstrue
the scope of the Board's statutory jurisdiction; however, the courts
would at least have to give greater consideration to the result the Board
reached under the Supreme Court's Natural Gas test, and the courts
might then conclude that the Board properly exercised its statutory jurisdiction.
M. EdwardTaylor

146. See Board of Trustees v. N.L.R.B., 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Chicago Youth Centers
v. N.L.R.B., 616 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980); Lutheran Welfare Serv. v. N.L.R.B., 607 F.2d 777 (7th
Cir. 1979).
147. The courts would also determine whether the Board exercised its discretionary authority

in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
148. A factor considered by both the "administered" portion of the statutory NaturalGas test

and the discretionary right of control test in determining whether an entity may properly claim
political subdivision status is the degree of control the state possesses over the entity. See supra

notes 47-48 and text accompanying note 82.
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. If an employer does not otherwise qualify as
a political subdivision under the NaturalGas test, see supra text accompanying note 31, then joint

employer status or a prior approval clause does not alter this result. See supra notes 105-19 and
122-25 and accompanying text. Because joint employer status and prior approval clauses do not

affect the outcome under the NaturalGas analysis, employers would have no incentive to alter
their contracts with political subdivisions in an attempt to avoid the Board's jurisdiction. Cf.
Board of Trustees v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
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